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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the trial court 
erred in admitting evidence of the burglary that occurred in 
Price, Utah on October 10 or 11, 1992, because there is 
absolutely no evidence that links that theft to the Defendant or 
the evidence in this case. 
Secondly, the trial court erred in ruling that the attempt 
by persons in the Defendant's car to exchange quarters for 
currency, without more, was sufficient for the officers involved 
to form a "reasonable suspicion" justifying the stop of the 
Defendant's car on the highway. 
Third, the trial court erred in denying the Defendant's 
Motion to Suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the 
Defendant's car on the grounds that the search was without a 
warrant or the consent of the Defendant and the officers lacks 
the requisite factual basis to form the necessary suspicion to 
authorize the search. Additionally, the Defendant was 
unreasonably detained on the roadway and based thereon, the 
evidence from the search should be suppressed 
Finally, the court erred in admitting evidence of the 
defendant's statements without clear independent proof of a 
crime. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE 
UNRELATED BURGLARY IN PRICE, UTAH. 
The Appellee, in it's brief, does not respond to the 
Appellant's contention that the introduction of the evidence 
concerning the burglary of coin and vending machines in Price, 
Utah constituted reversible error. The only mention, by the 
State, of that evidence is on page thirty-six of the appellee's 
brief in which the State argues that the evidence was properly 
admitted to establish the corpus delicti of the crime (Appellee's 
brief, p. 36). 
The alleged theft in Price, Utah occurred on October 10 or 
11, 1992 in Price. The Defendant was stopped on October 27, 1992, 
sixteen days later. The theft was not discovered by the 7-11 
store manager in Price until the morning of October 12, 1992. 
There is no evidence that the seven oriental individuals that 
were seen by the store clerk at the 7-11 on October 10 had 
anything to do with the theft as opposed to other patrons or 
employees of the store. There is not even a scintilla of evidence 
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that the Defendant had anything to do with the burglary. There 
was no physical evidence introduced by the State that tied the 
Defendant to the crime and there was nothing in the Defendant's 
statements or in the other evidence relating the Defendant to the 
crime. The computer board supposedly stolen from the 7-11 was 
not found in the possession of the Defendant or his companions 
and the cutters found with other regular tools in the car being 
driven by the Defendant were not, by stipulation of the parties, 
the cutters that cut the lock of the 7-11 in Price. 
The evidence and testimony about the crime in Price, to 
which the Defendant could not be linked consumed the major 
portion of the trial. 
The argument of the State that the evidence was used only to 
establish the corpus delicti of the crime is blatantly false. 
The evidence of the Price burglary was used from the onset for 
the purpose of establishing reasonable suspicion for the stop, a 
basis for the warrantless search and as evidence of the corpus 
delicti of the crime. The tentacles of the improper evidence 
reached into every aspect of this case. The relevant provisions 
of the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which 
document the infiltration of the evidence are as follows: 
Findings of Fact 
3. Dispatchers contacted Price and were told that 
Price Police were investigating a recent burglary 
and theft involving large numbers of quarters from 
a video arcade game. 
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16. On October 10, 1992, a 7-11 in Price was burglar-
ized. At approximately 2:00 a.m. seven oriental indi-
viduals entered the store and began playing video 
games which they did for approximately forty minutes. 
The individuals then left and the clerk did not notice 
anything wrong with the video machine. At the 
beginning of the next shift it was noticed that the 
video machine was blank and not operating. The owner 
checked the machine and discovered that the lock to 
the coin box had been cut, the door to the coin 
collection box pried opened and the coin box removed. 
The Price City Police were called to the 7-11 on 
October 12, 1992 and an official report was taken and 
an investigation started. 
17. It was stipulated that the bolt cutters seized 
in the car the Defendant was driving was excluded as 
having cut the lock on the 7-11 in Price. 
Conclusions of Law 
1. The initial stop of the automobile being driven by 
the Defendant was lawful being based upon reasonable 
suspicion that the Defendant or the occupants of the 
car were involved in video burglaries in the Price area 
or that the occupants of the car contained evidence 
which may have been relevant to the Price 
investigation. 
3. The warrantless search of the automobile was based 
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upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. More 
specifically, a reasonable person in viewing the evi-
dence available to the officers could have concluded 
that it was likely that the automobile contained 
evidence relevant to a burglary or theft of coins 
in the Price area. . . .(Emphasis added) 
R. 107-111. 
The trial court's findings establish first that Maxine 
Barker, the owner/manager of the restaurant in Spanish Fork 
Canyon observed a car occupied by five oriental individuals who 
attempted to sell her quarters wrapped in yellow notebook paper 
(R. 112-13). Secondly, that based upon calls to other 
establishments in Spanish Fork Canyon it was determined that 
attempts to sell quarters at other establishments had occurred 
(R. 111). It is against that factual background that the court 
makes it's finding, quoted above, that Price authorities wanted 
to question the individuals with regard to a "recent" burglary or 
theft. 
The facts are that the alleged burglary or theft in Price 
could not be related to having been committed by the Defendant 
and his traveling companions and had occurred approximately 
sixteen or seventeen days prior to the time the Defendant was 
stopped in the canyon. Further, there is no evidence that Price 
authorities wanted to question the Defendant and his companions 
with regard to the 7-11 burglary. The only mention of the carbon 
county authorities was in the testimony of Shannon Horn, a Utah 
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County dispatcher, where she testified: 
Q. Was Carbon County contacted? 
A. I contacted Rosaline at Carbon County in 
their dispatch. She's a dispatcher. And 
she told me, yes, that they had thefts and 
burglaries and vending machines where quarters 
had been taken. 
T. 37, Lines 6 to 10; 39, Lines 6 to 16; 40, Lines 2 to 17. 
There is no testimony indicating that anyone want in Carbon 
County wanted to talk to the Defendant and his companions, 
regarding the burglary at the 7-11 or that anyone provided a date 
associated with any thefts of vending machines in Price, upon 
which someone could conclude that the burglaries were even 
recent. 
Penney Turner, the dispatcher for the Highway Patrol, 
Department of Public Safety, testified that on the day the 
Defendant was stopped she received the information that was 
forwarded to the officers regarding the matter from only the Utah 
County Dispatcher (Tr. 43, Line 1 to 44, Line 21). 
It is clear that from the simple tidbit of information that 
there had been unspecified burglaries in the Carbon County area, 
from a dispatcher in Price communicated to the dispatcher in Utah 
County, came a factual scenario that was communicated to the 
officers making the stop of the Defendant that was without any 
basis in fact. The distortions in the actual information 
obtained by the dispatchers grew each time it was provided to 
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another dispatcher or officer. Exhibit 11, attached in the 
Addendum to this brief contains copies of the actual notes of the 
Utah Highway Patrol dispatchers, which information came from the 
Utah County Dispatchers. As noted on page four of the Exhibit, 
Rash of burglaries throughout the State 
Asian gang 7-lls and vend machines 
Printed circ board bolt cutters quarters 
Exhibit 6. 
Patrolman Dennis Shields who made the traffic stop was told 
by dispatch that Price City wanted to talk to the individuals 
about the burglary (Tr. 58, Lines 18 to 23). 
Evidence is relevant if it has "any tendency to make the 
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination 
of the action more or less probable than it would be without the 
evidence." Rule 401 U.R.E. Further, Rule 404(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence provides that: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show that he acted in 
conformity therewith. It may, however, 
be admissible for other purposes, such as 
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan knowledge, identity, or 
absence of mistake or accident. 
Admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is a question of law 
and is reviewed by the appellate court for correctness. The 
trial court's underlying factual determination should be given 
deference by the appellate court and should only be overruled 
when they are clearly erroneous. State v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 14, 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App.1993). In this case, the trial 
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court made no factual findings related to the evidence except 
that the court overruled the objections of the defense to it's 
introduction (Tr. 10, L. 25 to 11, L. 10; 14, L.24 to 15, L.3; 
23, Lines 5 to 8). 
There was no evidence during the entire trial that linked 
the Defendant to the burglary in Price that occurred sixteen days 
before he was stopped. The introduction and use of that evidence 
to validate "reasonable suspicion," a warrantless search, the 
corpus delicti of a crime was error and because of the 
significance placed upon it by the court, was reversible error. 
On appeal, this Court must determine whether there is a 
reasonable likelihood, absent the error, of an outcome more 
favorable to the Defendant. Sate v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 239-
40 (Utah 1992); State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 120-21 (Utah 1989); 
State v. Cloud, 722 P. 2d 750, 752 (Utah 1986). Given the fact 
that the trial court used the evidence to decide each major issue 
of this case from the basis for the stop, search and as evidence 
of the corpus delicti of the crime, there is no question that a 
difference result, more favorable to the Defendant, would have 
occurred. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE 
STOP OF THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WAS PROPER. 
The decision of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Deitman, 
739 P. 2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) describes the three levels of 
encounters between police and citizens as follows: 
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(1) an officer may approach a citizen at anytime 
and pose questions so long as the citizen is not 
detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize 
a person if the officer has an "articulable suspicion" 
that the person has committed or is about to 
commit a crime; however, the "detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to 
effectuate the purpose of the stop"; (3) an officer 
may arrest a suspect if the officer has probable 
cause to believe an offense has been committed or 
is being committed. 
Id., (quoting United States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th 
Cir. 1984), cert, denied, Hartsel v. United States, 476 U.S. 
1142, 106 S. Ct. 2250 (1986)). 
There is no question that when a law enforcement official 
stops a motor vehicle, a "seizure" occurs, giving the 
participants therein the rights guaranteed by the Fourth 
Amendment. State v. Holmes. 774 P.2d 506, 507 (Utah App. 1989). 
As stated by the Court in State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 
(Utah App. 1987), a seizure under the Fourth Amendment must be 
based on specific articulable facts, which, together with 
rational inferences drawn from them, would lead a reasonable 
person to conclude that the defendant had committed or was about 
to commit a crime. 
The United States Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880 (1968) required that an officer be 
able to point to "specific and articulable facts which taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion. . . . " 
Utah has codified the requirement of reasonable suspicion in 
Utah Code Annotated 77-7-15 (1990): 
9 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe 
he has committed or is in the act of committing or 
is attempting to commit a public offense and may 
demand his name, address and an explanation of 
his actions. 
See also: State v. Deitman, supra. at 617-18. 
In determining the existence of "reasonable suspicion," 
courts are to engage in a totality of the circumstances analysis 
to determine whether there was a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
conduct. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah App. 1991), 
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989). 
The State argues that the information known to Patrolman 
Shields, who made the stop, that constituted a "reasonable 
suspicion" was the information regarding the attempt to sell 
quarters, and the information contained on the Attempt to Locate 
communicated to him by dispatch (Appellee's Brief, pp. 17-23). 
The State argues that the simple attempt to exchange coins 
for currency is sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
(Appellee's brief, p. 21-22). Not one of the cases cited by the 
State recite only the tangential evidence produced in this case 
and even then, do not condone anything other than a momentary 
first level stop. State v. Sell, 496 P. 2d 44 (Or. App. 1972); 
People v. Evans, 32 111. App.3d 865, 336 N.E.2d 792 (1975); 
People v. Beard, 35 111.App.3d 725, 342 N.E.2d 343 (1976); State 
v. Maxie, 377 P.2d 435 (Wash. 1962). 
It is submitted that the stop of the Defendant was made by 
the officers based upon the alleged statement that officials in 
Price wanted to talk to the Defendant and his companions, which 
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statement has no basis in the testimony. Any attempt now to 
elevate the simple process of exchanging coins for currency into 
a suspicious activity, without more, does not meet the tests 
adopted by this Court. There was not a factual basis sufficient 
to form a reasonable suspicion to make the stop of the Defendant. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO SUPPRESS BASED UPON THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH 
OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE. 
The most blatant misinterpretation of the facts by the 
State relates to the contention that the warrantless search was 
justified. The State points to: 
Although the coins in both Maxie and Beard 
were arguably more distinctive than those involved in 
this case, the important similarity between the three 
cases is that the investigating officers knew that the 
coins in question were the same type as those that 
had been recently stolen in nearby burglaries. . . . 
Appellee's Brief, pp. 29-30. The facts are that the information 
actually obtained from Price was only that there had been 
burglaries. No reference as to a time period, number and 
specifically to the 7-11 burglary occupying the bulk of evidence 
at trial was mentioned by the Carbon County dispatcher. 
The State continues: 
In this case, the officers had a report involving 
the recent theft of quarters from vending machines 
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in a neighboring county. When coupled with 
Defendantf s suspicious conduct as reported by 
ordinary citizens, that report takes on added 
significance. 
Appellee's Brief, p. 31. As indicated above, there is absolutely 
no factual basis for the conclusion that there had been recent 
burglaries or thefts. There was no indication by the Carbon 
County dispatcher as to particular crimes or dates they occurred 
and absolutely no reference to the denomination of the coins. 
Lastly, the State contends that the Defendant's unresponsive 
answers and failure to provide information related to the 
ownership of the vehicle constituted cause for the warrantless 
search (Appellee's Brief 33-34). The State also argued that 
Officer Hill has properly concluded that the vehicle might have 
been stolen and that fact justified the search (Appellee's Brief, 
p. 9). 
The problem with the argument of the State is that the 
search was already conducted by the other officers when Officer 
Hill had accumulated the information relied upon. Patrolman 
Shields testified that after he stopped the vehicle, he asked the 
Defendant if he had a large amount of quarters to which the 
Defendant answered "no." The officer then got the Defendant out 
of the vehicle, took the keys out of the ignition and learned 
that the Defendant was returning from Denver and that the car 
belonged to a friend. At that juncture, Detective Hill arrived 
on the scene and took the Defendant back to his vehicle (Tr. 57, 
12 
L. 14 to 62, Line 16). 
Deputy Hill testified that as he started his interrogation 
and before he had obtained any damaging information and relayed 
it to other officers, the search had already been conducted (Tr. 
74, L. 9 to 79, L. 7). There is no question that the information 
relied upon by Detective Hill was obtained subsequent to the time 
the search was actually conducted and the information he obtained 
was not relied upon by the other officers in conducting the 
search. 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Limb, 581 P. 2d 142 (Utah 
1978) adopted the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in 
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970), allowing the warrantless 
search of an automobile where the law enforcement officers 
possess probable cause for the search and there are exigent 
circumstances justifying the warrantless search. 
As detailed in the previous point, there was no probable 
cause for search of the vehicle as defined by this Court. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONFESSION BASED UPON THE ABSENCE 
OF INDEPENDENT EVIDENCE. 
As established above, there was evidence of some crime 
occurring sixteen days before the stop of the vehicle the 
Defendant was driving. There is no question that the Defendant 
was not connected at any time, even by his own statements to that 
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crime. Accordingly, there is no evidence, apart from the 
statement ultimately given by the Defendant of a crime. 
Accordingly, the trial court allowed evidence of his confession 
to be introduced before sufficient independent evidence of a 
crime was introduced. Utah law on the subject is established by 
State v. Weldon, 6 Utah 2d 372, 314 P.2d 353 (Utah 1957). 
In that case the Court noted that the "rule is quite 
universal that an extrajudicial confession, by itself, is not 
sufficient to sustain a conviction of a crime, but there must be 
evidence, independent of the confession to establish the corpus 
delicti." _Id at 354. The rule established in the English common 
law was to prevent the conviction of the innocent on the strength 
of false confessions. Id. at 354. 
In defining a test to describe the quantum of proof 
necessary to establish the crime and satisfy the requirement, the 
Court stated: 
Although they vary, it seem quite generally agreed 
that the evidence of the corpus delicti need not 
be "beyond reasonable doubt," "conclusive" or 
"sufficient to warrant a conviction," independent 
of other evidence. From a perusal of such authorities 
it seem to us, that the generally accepted view, to 
which we give our approval, is that the evidence 
independent of the confession need not establish the 
corpus delicti by separate, full or positive proof, 
and that the whole evidence, including the confession, 
may be considered together in determining whether 
the corpus delicti has been satisfactorily established 
. . . . (Emphasis added) 
Id. at 356. Justice Crockett then stated that the rule to be 
employed is that there must "be independent, clear and convincing 
evidence of the corpus delicti. . . . " Id. at 357. See also, 
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State v. Ferry, 2 Utah 2d 371, 275 P. 2d 173 (Utah 1954). 
There is no serious question that there was not independent 
evidence of a crime established by clear and convincing proof to 
warrant the introduction of the Defendant's statement. 
CONCLUSION 
The testimony in this case establishes that the trial court 
improperly allowed evidence of the burglary in Price to inundate 
every aspect of the Defendant's trial. The evidence was not 
sufficient to support a finding of a reasonable suspicion to 
support the stop and certainly does not support a finding of 
probable cause to support the length and duration of the stop and 
the warrantless search of the vehicle 
Finally, there was no independent evidence of a crime, apart 
from the confession and the conviction on that basis, should be 
reversed. 
Dated this /fT day of March, 1994. 
Steven B. Killp^kvEsq. 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that four (4) copies of the Appellant's Brief were 
mailed to Jan Graham, Attorney General, 236 State Capitol, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84114, on this /<f day of March, 1994. 
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CASE REPORT: CALLS FOR SERVICE DATE PRINTED: 01/19/93 
00.Agency: U UHP-UTAH COUNTY Ol.Inc #: 92071169 Q2.Rec By: PENNY 
03.Date Reported: 10/27/92 04.Time Reported: 1045 OS.Shift: 1 7AM - 3PM_ 
05.Activity: ASTQA ASSIST OTHER AGENCY 07.Priority: 2 -ASAP 
03. City [ 09.Loc NB IIS V MAIN AF 10.B/R 0000U1 
ll.Apttt Name Tel Kow Rec _ Type 
16.Add: _ 17.City 18.St: 
19.Rem: 5 M/OHIENTALS IN GRY/WHITE TOYT LIC/0S7EHV. 
20.Units: 0169 0060 035S 0433 30.Off: 
32.Disp 1045 Enrt 1045 Arr 1045 Comp 1244 *Transp* Enrt Arr Comp 
39.Other Agcy: 41.Ad: _42.Dsp By: 43.Case#: 592000002249 44-Dispo: 4 
45.Line-1: DUFFLE BAG, 75 LBS FILLED WITH QUARTERS. INDIVIDUALS WANTED 
46.Line-2: FOR THEFT OF QUARTERS FROM VENDING MACHINES THROUGHOUR CARBON 
47.Line-3: EMERY UTAH AND SL COUNTYS. ALL 5 WERE ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO 
4B.Line-4: AM FORK PD (APPARENTLY FOR QUESTIONING) 159 TURNED THE CASE OVER 
4S %Lme-S: TO UTAHl.CO X'ETECTIVES , UHP ASSISTED IN ARREST * T S L U C P H C T 
CASE REPORT: CALLS FOR SERVICE DATE PRINTED: 01/19/93 
00.Agency: U UHP-UTAH COUNTY Ol.Inc ft: 92071169 02.Eec By: PENNY 
03.Date Reported: 10/27/92 04.Time Reported: 1045 OS.Shift: 1 7AM - 3PM_ 
OS.Activity: ASTOA ASSIST OTHER AGENCY 07.Priority: 2 -ASAP 
03.City 09.Loc MB 115 W MAIN AF 10.B/R 0000UN 
ll.Apttt Name Tel Kow Rec _ Type _ 
15.Add: 17.City 18.St: 
19.Rem: 5 M/ORIEMTALS IN GRY/WHITE TOYT LIC/0S7EHV. 
20. Units: 0169 0050 03SS 0433 30.0££: 
32.Disp 104S Enrt 1045 Arr 1045 Coap 1244 *Transp* Enrt Arr Coap 
39.Other Agcy: 41.Ad: _42.Dsp By: 43.Case#: 692000002249 44.Dispo: 4 
45.Line-1: DUFFLE BAG, 75 LBS FILLED WITH QUARTERS. INDIVIDUALS WANTED 
46.Line-2: FOR THEFT OF QUARTERS FROM VENDING MACHINES THROUGHOUR CARBON 
47. Line-3: EMERY UTAH AND SL COUNTYS. ALL S WERE ARRESTED AND TAKEN TO 
48. Line-4: AM FORK PD (APPARENTLY FOR QUESTIONING) 169 TURNED THE CASE OVER 
